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COMMENT 
LOOMING DANGERS 
TURKEY AND ARMENIA: OPENING MINDS, OPENING 
BORDERS: A PERILOUS BLUEPRINT 
On April 14, 2009, the International Crisis Group (ICG), a think tank that 
provides suggestions on conflict resolutions around the globe, issued a report 
entitled Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders in which it 
made recommendations for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and the estab-
lishment of bilateral relations between the Republics of Armenia and Turkey. 1 
The report was published after the newly elected American President, Barack 
Obama, visited Turkey in early April 2009, and eight days before the Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Turkey 
and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a joint statement 
about a road-map to normalize relations between the two countries. 
Surprisingly, it attempts to situate its recommendations at a time when 
Turkey and Armenia "are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled the 
Caucasus" and, despite past difficulties, claims that progressively "intense" 
official engagement, civil society, and international and public opinion change 
have transformed the nature of the relationship between these two countries (p. 
i). In essence, it posits that fresh endeavors brought the two countries to the 
verge of an historical agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties, and 
begin joint work on reconciliation. 
Like similar efforts, this ICG report seems idealist, perhaps even super-
ficial, and aims at portraying a very optimistic picture of current Armenian-
Turkish relations. Furthermore, it tends to view minor developments with a 
magnifying glass, advancing vast generalizations to bypass crucial issues that 
remain as major obstacles towards a sincere Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. 
The report provides a solution to the century-old conflict in 34 pages and 
asserts that the bipolar views of history among Turks and Armenians are "con-
verging, showing that the significant deep traumas can be healed" (p. i). One 
wonders what are the major indications of this significant convergence of the 
bipolar views of history, and how they might address core concerns? 
The report first provides an executive summary and recommendations for 
improved Armenian-Turkish ties.· From the very beginning, the tone is akin 
to a school headmaster who summons students who duked it out in the court-
yard and, after rebuking them both, insists they end their animosities against 
1 Europe Report, No. 199, available in pdf format on the international Crisis Group 
website at http://www.crisisgroup/home/index.cfm. The direct URL for the report is 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id = 6050&1 = 1 
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each other by shaking hands. In its upfront recommendation section, the leG 
advises both Turkey and Armenia to "agree, ratify, and implement a normal-
isation package including the opening of borders, establish ... diplomatic re-
lations and bilateral commissions, [and] continue to prepare public opinion for 
reconciliation" (p. ii). It further advocates Armenia to avoid using third coun-
try legislative assemblies to pass resolutions pertaining to the Armenian Geno-
cide while warning Turkey not to hold Armenia accountable for these actions. 
As to the Nagorno-Karabagh Question, the report counsels Turkey not to use 
it as a precondition for any normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. Fur-
thermore, it recommends both countries pursue broader research on matters 
pertaining to the "events of 1915" (p. ii), as it clearly indicates that both 
parties have to compromise historical views for the sake of normalization. In-
asmuch as such a declaration is epochal, a major ethical question is raised 
regarding the extent to which the "victimized group" has to comprise on an 
historical realty, to satisfy political objectives of the "perpetrator group." 
Even third parties to the conflict (the United States, Russia, and the European 
Union) are called upon to avoid damning legislation that might inflame public 
opinion on either side (in reality it is the Turkish side only) and back Turkey-
Armenia reconciliation endeavors. 
Because the short report is packed with key details, it may be useful to 
provide a brief description of its contents, to better inform readers of its goals. 
As it is divided into seven sections, the report briefly discusses the "history" 
of Armenian-Turkish relations in its introduction, marking the visit of Turkish 
President Abdullah Giil, on an invitation of his Armenian counterpart, as a 
stepping-stone towards normalization. The second section, entitled "The State 
of Negotiations," claims that a "package deal" (p. 4) is on the table, com-
prised of the establishment of full diplomatic ties, and the opening of border 
crossings, as well as the creation of a new inter-governmental commission, in-
cluding a sub-commission to address issues that may preoccupy the "historical 
commission" (p. 6). In the third section, "The Burdens of Conflicting Histo-
ries," leG authors posit how Armenia and Turkey view the "events of 1915" 
(p. 5), confessing in footnote 65 that the leG does not opine as a specialist in 
Ottoman or Genocide studies, but strives to "collect the arguments of different 
people about the many narratives and debates, put them in contemporary po-
litical context and show where they influence Turkey-Armenia relations" (p. 
8). Given this blatant admission, one is tempted to ask how can any attempt 
towards normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations take place without a 
proper assessment of history? Without exaggeration, this is something that the 
leG report failed to achieve and, in fact, the report's major deficiency lies in 
a serious lack of historical analyses. Parenthetically, it is noteworthy to under-
line that the report relies on a very limited number of documents to buttress 
its case, and which are critical to discuss serious concerns. One wonders 
whether genuine rapprochement between the two nations and countries is pos-
sible absent such transparency. Still, the report tends to portray a superficial 
picture of the nature of Armenian-Turkish relations without a sound under-
standing of power-asymmetry, dynamics of power, historical transformations, 
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regional and international politics and most importantly the complexity of the 
Armenian Diaspora and the many roles that members of the latter play and are 
likely to in the future. 
Even worse, the leG report presents the 1915 "events" from the Turkish 
and Armenian perspectives , as it attempts to illustrate the convergence that has 
been taking place among some Turkish intellectuals who now describe the 
Armenian Genocide as "Biiyiik Felaket," supposedly the translation of the 
Armenian Medz Yeghern (Mets Eghetn) , which is "frequently used by the Ar-
menians to describe the 1915 events" (p. 9). Sources used in this section on 
the Armenian Genocide are extremely weak, with a single interview of one 
independent Armenian historian, to present the "Armenian side" (p. 10) of the 
question. Furthermore, the author(s) portray the Armenian government in 
Yerevan as the sole player in Armenian-Turkish relations and, by doing so, 
strip the Armenian Diaspora of any meaningful input on the matter. This is 
questionable at best and probably a source of future confrontations within 
Armenian communities that must be carefully assessed. Indeed, in its fourth 
section, entitled "External Influences," the leG adamantly disparages third 
countries for passing genocide resolutions, and suggests a more active role by 
the United States in particular to bring both parties to the negotiating table. 
Remarkably, such assertions neglect to underscore that the American Consti-
tution guarantees certain rights to its citizens, including the privilege to lobby 
their government on issues of concern. Attempts to minimize or even bypass 
the role of the Armenian Diaspora in the United States may actually be a mon-
umental error and should not be contemplated haphazardly. 
With section five, the report dwells on "Public Opinion," by making such 
grandiose statements that attitudes in both countries are ready for a new chap-
ter in Armenian-Turkish relations . It declares that support in'Armenia for a 
border opening-even without a Turkish recognition of the Armenian Geno-
cide-has grown to "more than half of the population" (p. 22). The source for 
this gem is an online poll conducted by the Al + organization, an opposition 
television channel in Yerevan. Likewise, the report explains how public opin-
ion in Turkey is changing dramatically, best illustrated by the December 2008 
apology campaign initiated by some 200 Turkish intellectuals, which was 
signed online by an estimated 29,500 individuals. However, the report conve-
niently neglects to cite that over 100,000 Turks signed a counter-apology cam-
paign within Turkey, which provides an equally powerful window into Turkish 
thinking. In discussing public opinion in Armenia and the Diaspora, the report 
deliberately tries to create a rift between Armenians in the Republic and those 
living in the Diaspora, by arguing that genocide recognition "may not be as 
high a priority for those in Armenia as it is for the diaspora" (p. 26). It then 
perpetuates the myth that the Diaspora is nothing more than a monolithic body 
of hardliners dominated by the nationalist Dashnak party. Remarkably, it al-
leges that Diaspora Armenians began to pay more attention to the genocide 
only when they witnessed how German Nazis were prosecuted for war crimes 
after the Jewish Holocaust. Beyond ugly opportunistic motives, this assertion 
may remind readers of classic Turkish arguments, which are entirely rejected. 
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Most of the proof showing that a change has taken place in the Diaspora is 
based on massive anonymous citations that further render the ICG report ques-
tionable as an impartial document. 
In its last section, "The Way Forward," the ICG attempts to shed light on 
future contacts by claiming that opening borders will benefit both countries and 
that increased choice in trade routes would also "reduce Armenia's dependence 
on Russia" (p. 28). 
Beyond its overall limited and at times challenged historical and political 
evaluations of Armenian-Turkish interactions, this latest ICG report is a su-
perficial portrayal of the nature of this complicated relationship. It creates a 
dichotomy between Armenian vs. Turkish sides, akin to a portrayal resembling 
a soccer match in which the ICG plays the role of referee, and which strips lay-
ers of critical concerns. As such, the report provides an "express solution" 
to the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation which is facile at best and deeply flaw-
ed at worst. It may be useful to compare similar efforts in different contexts 
to evaluate whether anything substantial was ever achieved by adopting such 
propositions. The road map anticipated by the Quartet (United States, Euro-
pean Union, Russia, and the United Nations) to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is one of the best testaments of this type of approach. To date, the 
Quartet has failed to add any value to the peace process, which remains mired 
in lofty but hollow pronouncements. A genuine Armenian-Turkish rapproche-
ment should obviously take place, but perhaps not on the pages of ICG re-
ports, no matter how admirable the International Crisis Group's intentions 
may be. Rather, it may be preferable for the parties themselves, Armenia, 
Turkey, Armenian Diaspora communities, and civil societies in both countries, 
to engage in active dialogues. Such efforts may gradually overcome existing 
obstacles, avoid express but fragile solutions, and establish the foundations of 
solid and lasting reconciliation. 
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